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ABSTRACT
AMD SEV is a hardware feature designed for the secure encryption
of virtual machines. SEV aims to protect virtual machine memory
not only from other malicious guests and physical attackers, but
also from a possibly malicious hypervisor. This relieves cloud and
virtual server customers from fully trusting their server providers
and the hypervisors they are using. We present the design and
implementation of SEVered, an attack from a malicious hypervisor
capable of extracting the full contents of main memory in plaintext
from SEV-encrypted virtual machines. SEVered neither requires
physical access nor colluding virtual machines, but only relies on a
remote communication service, such as a web server, running in
the targeted virtual machine. We verify the effectiveness of SEVered
on a recent AMD SEV-enabled server platform running different
services, such as web or SSH servers, in encrypted virtual machines.
With these examples, we demonstrate that SEVered reliably and
efficiently extracts all memory contents even in scenarios where
the targeted virtual machine is under high load.
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1 INTRODUCTION
As a common practice, cloud and virtual server customers con-
veniently run their services in Virtual Machines (VMs) remotely
operated on the platforms of their server providers. The privileged
Hypervisors (HVs) on these platforms ensure the logical separation
of multiple VMs operating on the same hardware. Attackers have
demonstrated that they are capable of circumventing this protec-
tion, achieving access to the memory of the VMs, e.g., with memory
attacks via Coldboot [8] or Direct Memory Access (DMA) [3, 4, 6],
or even gaining complete control of the HV [11, 14, 15]. However,
the server provider running the HV poses the most obvious danger
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to the VM’s integrity and data confidentiality. Customers must rely
on the trustworthiness of the providers and their HVs, since they
can easily access all of the VMs’ memory and identify sensitive data
such as keys, passwords, or classified information.
To reduce the attack surface of virtualized systems towards ma-
licious server providers, AMD introduced Secure Encrypted Vir-
tualization (SEV) [2]. SEV is capable of transparently encrypting
individual VMs using a Secure Processor (SP). The technology espe-
cially targets server systems and enables VMs to request encryption
and receive proof about the encryption from the SP. The memory
of each protected VM is encrypted within the SP based on an in-
dividual ephemeral key never leaving the SP. The implementation
in hardware not only makes the systems resistant against memory
attacks, but also prevents HVs from accessing sensitive VM data.
With SEVered, we demonstrate that it is nevertheless possible for
a malicious HV to extract all memory of an SEV-encrypted VM in
plaintext. We base SEVered on the observation that the page-wise
encryption of main memory lacks integrity protection [2, 9, 10].
While the VM’s Guest Virtual Address (GVA) to Guest Physical
Address (GPA) translation is controlled by the VM itself and opaque
to the HV, the HV remains responsible for the Second Level Address
Translation (SLAT), meaning that it maintains the VM’s GPA toHost
Physical Address (HPA) mapping in main memory. This enables
us to change the memory layout of the VM in the HV. We use
this capability to trick a service in the VM, such as a web server,
into returning arbitrary pages of the VM in plaintext upon the
request of a resource from outside. We first identify the encrypted
pages in memory corresponding to the resource, which the service
returns as a response to a specific request. By repeatedly sending
requests for the same resource to the service while re-mapping
the identified memory pages, we extract all the VM’s memory in
plaintext. SEVered neither requires detailed knowledge of the target
VM or service, nor a malicious process colluding from inside the
VM. Our attack is also resistant to noise, i.e., concurrent activity in
the target VM, and dynamically adapts to different noise levels.
2 ATTACK METHOD
Our target is an AMD SEV-enabled platformwhich runs an attacker-
controlled HV and one or more VMs as shown in Figure 1. Our
target VM’s memory is fully encrypted by SEV. While being able
to target multiple VMs at the same time, we describe our attack
for a single VM. Inside the target VM, we assume presence of the
following components:
Service. A process running inside the VM offering a resource via a
publicly accessible remote connection. Common examples
are HTTP, SSH, FTP or mail servers.
Resource. Data in VM memory that is remotely readable through
a service. A resource can spread over one or more memory
ar
X
iv
:1
80
5.
09
60
4v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
4 M
ay
 20
18
EuroSec’18, April 23–26, 2018, Porto, Portugal Mathias Morbitzer, Manuel Huber, Julian Horsch and Sascha Wessel
Target VM  VM
  Kernel
HV
SP
Kernel
RAM
Service
Process
GVA
Space
GPA
Space
HPA
Space
Process ProcessResource ......
...
......
Figure 1: Overview on our memory extraction concept on a
memory encryption platform with different VMs.
pages. A representative example in the context of a web
server is a HTML page or a file offered for download. The
suitability of a resource for SEVered depends on its size and
stickiness, as discussed in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. We consider a
resource to be sticky if it is probable that the resource remains
present in guest-physical memory and is not relocated or
evicted during our attack.
After identifying an appropriate service and resource in the target
VM, the actual VM memory extraction is executed. The following
two phases characterize our method:
(1) Resource Identification. In this phase, we identify mem-
ory pages of the chosen resource in physical memory. As
described before, the address translation in the VM is opaque
to the HV due to SEV’s memory encryption. Therefore, sev-
eral techniques have to be combined to reliably identify the
GPAs belonging to the resource, as described in Section 2.1.
(2) Data Extraction. In this phase, we extract plaintext from
the encrypted VM by repeating requests while switching
the mapping of the identified resource GPAs to HPAs in the
HV as shown on the bottom of Figure 1. After completion,
we restore the original state of the VM by mapping the re-
source pages to their original HPAs. This phase is described
in Section 2.2.
2.1 Resource Identification
Despite the opaqueness of the VM’s guest memory mappings due to
SEV’s encryption, the HV still controls the mapping from GPAs to
actual physical pages, i.e., HPAs.We use this capability to establish a
basic technique we call page tracking to gain information about the
VM’s memory layout. During page tracking our HV registers each
access to a GPA and the corresponding physical page by the targeted
VM. We realize the page tracking by invalidating the Page Table
Entrys (PTEs) of the VM, i.e., by removing their present flags. As
soon as a page is accessed, it triggers a page fault which we record
before setting the present flag again. Hence, the page tracking
triggers exactly once for each accessed page before tracking is
restarted.
The goal of the resource identification phase is to identify the set
of pages that store the service’s response, i.e., the target resource.
We define the unknown set of resource pages as follows:
R = {p : Page p contains (part of) the target resource}
The only information available to identify the target resource
are the GPAs accessed by the VM as result of the described tracking
process by the HV. When simply tracking a request to the target
resource, the result contains a lot of pages that do not belong to
the resource. With additional noise, e.g., concurrent activity caused
by other clients accessing the VM, the tracking also records those
accesses, making the result even fuzzier. To reliably identify our
target resource in VMs with varying noise levels, we propose an
iterative approach. The higher the noise, the more iterations can
be conducted to converge to an approximation of R. We repeat the
following steps n ∈ N times. The current iteration of our identi-
fication process is i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We start each iteration i by
requesting the resource via the target service and record all pages
the VM accesses while fulfilling the request:
Ri = {p : Page p accessed during request i for target resource}
Since we request the resource ourselves, this gives us a sample set
which is guaranteed to contain the resource pages:
R ⊆ Ri
Ri is typically large (|R | ≪ |Ri |) since it includes not only the
resource itself but also other pages of the service as well as memory
pages of other processes and parts of the kernel. All concurrent
activity during the recording must be considered as noise, as it
directly increases |Ri |. We call this type of noise R-noise. Based on
the observation that R ⊆ Ri , we can refine this set by intersecting
all Ri recorded up to this point for which also holds R ⊆ Ri :
Ri = Ri−1 ∩ Ri R0 = R1
Ri is updated on each iteration and contains only pages that are ac-
cessed for each access to the resource. After an appropriate number
of iterations it should therefore only contain pages directly required
for fulfilling the request to the target resource, filtering unrelated
pages, such as pages from other processes.
Next, we want to sample a set of page accesses which is similar
to Ri but without accessing our target resource. Hence, we continue
our iteration i by requesting an arbitrary other resource, for example,
a different web page, from the same service. Again, we track and
record all pages the VM accesses during the request:
Xi = {p : Page p accessed during request i for other resource}
Xi only contains target resource pages if another client accesses
the resource while we record. Hence, pages that are part of Xi are
unlikely to contain p ∈ R. Based on this, we define a set of likely
candidates Ci for each iteration by subtracting those pages from Ri :
Ci = R
i \ Xi
This step filters all pages that are part of the service but not the re-
source itself. Because of the subtraction, while recordingXi wemust
only consider accesses to the target resource as noise. We call this
X-noise. We define a multiset Ci , which provides the information
how often a page was identified as candidate, to gather all candidates
from all iterations. We denote the multiplicity of an element p in a
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multisetA asA(p). Based on this, we specify the union of a multiset
as sum of multiplicities, i.e., (A⊎ B)(p) = A(p)+ B(p), and the inter-
section asmultiplication of multiplicities, i.e., (A∩B)(p) = A(p)·B(p).
With this we define Ci as:
Ci = (Ci−1 ⊎Ci ) ∩ Ri C0 = ∅
For candidates inCi which are already present inCi−1, themultiplic-
ity increases inCi . The intersection with Ri ensures that candidates
from a previous iteration (p ∈ Ci−1) that can be excluded with the
knowledge gained in the current iteration (p < Ri ) are completely
removed from Ci . We calculate the probability that a candidate
page p ∈ Ci is part of our target resource after iteration i based on
how often it was a candidate:
Pi [p ∈ R] = C
i (p)
|Ci |
Note that if |R | > 1, the probability is distributed between all p ∈ R.
Therefore, the probability is only interpreted in relation to the
probability of other pages p ∈ Ci .
Finally, after n iterations, we calculate the probability Pn [p ∈ R]
for each p ∈ Cn and build a list of candidate pages sorted by prob-
ability. By choosing n appropriately, our model is able to remove
noise during both sampling phases (R- and X-noise), as shown in
our evaluation in Section 3. With the resulting list, we start the
extraction phase described in the next section.
Example. In order to clarify the resource identification mecha-
nism, consider the following simplified example. During our first
iteration (i = 1) we record R1 and X1 and calculate:
R1 = {4, 8, 15, 16, 23, 42}
R1 = R0 ∩ R1 = R1 ∩ R1 = {4, 8, 15, 16, 23, 42}
X1 = {3, 8, 12, 15, 16, 23, 27}
C1 = R
1 \ X1 = {4, 42}
C1 = (C0 ⊎C1) ∩ R1 = (∅ ⊎ {4, 42}) ∩ R1 = {4, 42}
During our second iteration (i = 2) we record and calculate:
R2 = {6, 8, 15, 16, 23, 42}
R2 = R1 ∩ R2 = {8, 15, 16, 23, 42}
X2 = {2, 8, 12, 13, 15, 23}
C2 = R
2 \ X2 = {16, 42}
C2 = (C1 ⊎C2) ∩ R2 = ({4, 42} ⊎ {16, 42}) ∩ R2
= {4, 16, 42, 42} ∩ {8, 15, 16, 23, 42} = {16, 42, 42}
Assuming n = 2, we now finished all iterations and calculate P2[p ∈
R] for the pages p ∈ C2:
P2[42 ∈ R] = C
2(42)
|C2 | =
2
3 P2[16 ∈ R] =
C2(16)
|C2 | =
1
3
Hence, we start our extraction phase with the page list [42, 16]
ordered by probability.
2.2 Data Extraction
The resource identification resulted in a list of GPAs for the target
VM which most probably contain the target resource. The data
extraction phase uses this list and the ability of the HV to switch
mappings from GPAs to HPAs to extract arbitrary decrypted mem-
ory from our target VM.
First, we determine the number of pages r that are at least neces-
sary to store the target resource. The sizes of the target resource Sr
and a single page Sp are known, so that we can determine r as Sr/Sp .
We then take the first r pages of the probability list and repeat the
following two steps:
(1) Page Remapping. We modify the Host Page Table (HPT)
entries of the r pages so that their GPAs point to the memory
pages we want to extract as depicted in Figure 1. After the
modification we ensure that the corresponding Translation
Lookaside Buffer (TLB) entries are flushed for the changes
to take effect immediately.
(2) Data Request. We request the target resource from our
service. Since the underlying pages for the resource were
remapped, the service unintentionally responds with data
from the pages we chose to extract.
We repeat both steps remapping the resource GPAs to all memory
regions of interest to extract them in plaintext.
If we receive the original resource for one or more of the r pages
replaced in the first step, those pages do not belong to the target
resource. In this case we continue the extraction with the next
pages in the probability list or repeat the identification phase.
Concurrent accesses during the extraction phase can have differ-
ent consequences. If the target resource itself is accessed by another
client, the access returns wrong data to the client. If a different re-
source that shares a page with our target resource is accessed, the
access returns wrong data and/or introduces malfunction in the
target VM. All other accesses are unaffected. To exclude malfunc-
tions, a target resource should be chosen which covers one or more
complete pages, as discussed in the following sections.
2.3 Resource Size
The size of the resource determines whether all memory can be
accessed and how many requests are required during the extraction
phase. To access all areas of memory, the targeted resource must
cover at least one entire page. The resource does not have to be
page-aligned and can, for example, cover the second half of one page
and the first half of another page. However, as explained before,
such resources should be avoided because of possible malfunctions
when concurrently accessed inside the VM.
Since all pages of the target resource can be remapped and used
for extraction in every iteration of the data extraction phase, the
larger the resource, the less iterations are required for extracting a
certain amount of memory. In our experiments (see Section 3) we
found that resources representing the content of a file in memory
are especially convenient. They have the advantage that a suffi-
ciently large file located in memory always covers at least one
memory page and that no other data is located on the same page.
This also guarantees that the page is always read starting without
offset and no data is omitted at the beginning. However, the service
only returns as many bytes as the actual size of the file.
2.4 Resource Stickiness
There are several factors that influence the degree of a resource’s
stickiness, some of which we discuss in the following:
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Figure 2: Measurements of top set size |T | for increasing number of iterations and different noise levels.
Resource type. Resource memory pages can have different at-
tributes. For example, they can be read-only or also writable.
One important distinction is, if they are file-backed, i.e., are
caching a part of a file in memory. When the system is low
onmemory, normal pages are swapped and file-backed pages
are simply removed from memory. Depending on the config-
uration of the target system, e.g., via the swappiness file in
Linux, file-backed pages are prioritized over non-file-backed
pages when choosing a page for eviction. Optimally, a re-
source should be chosen based on its type matching the
target VM’s configuration for maximum stickiness.
Process priority. When the target VM completely runs out of
memory (including swap), it typically starts to kill processes.
Optimally, a target service should be chosen that is unlikely
to be killed when running out of memory.
VMmemory pressure. Asmemory pressure in the VM decreases,
the stickiness of all resources offered by all services in the
increases and vice versa.
For a target VM running a typical Linux-based OS, we found in
our evaluation that file resources cached in the Linux page cache
provide high stickiness.
3 EVALUATION
We implemented our prototype on a system powered by an AMD
EPYC 7251 processor with SEV fully enabled. Our system runs De-
bian Linux with the SEV-enabled kernel in version 4.13.0-rc1 and
QEMU 2.9.50 as provided by AMD [1]. As malicious HV, we used
Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) and modified it to execute our
attack. To realize our tracking mechanism, we extended the KVM
infrastructure for guest write access tracking [7] to track all kinds
of accesses. We furthermore extended KVM with functionality to
alter memory mappings for the extraction phase. Both features can
be controlled by the attacker in the host Linux running the target
VM. In the following, we evaluate our prototype based on services
commonly found in target VMs. We chose two web servers, Apache
2.4.25-3 and nginx 1.10.3-1, as well as an SSH server, OpenSSH
1:7.4p1-10. As target resource to be served by these services, we
used a file of size 4 KB filling exactly one page in memory. We
evaluate both phases of our attack separately.
3.1 Resource Identification
For our evaluation, the target page tp of our page-sized target
resource is known. Based on this, we define a top set which we use
to measure the performance of our identification mechanism:
Ti = {p ∈ Ri : Pi [p ∈ R] ≥ Pi [tp ∈ R]}
The top set Ti contains all pages that our identification algorithm
considers at least as likely to be the target page as the actual target
page tp after i iterations. The smaller the set T , the better the
identification. To ensure that the identification works in real world
environments, we introduced four levels of noise into our target VM
during our tests. A noise level of 20 refers to an environment where
on the average 20 random accesses per second are made to our three
services by arbitrary peers. Our noise model therefore generates
both X-noise and R-noise (see Subsection 2.1). For each noise level
and service, we conducted eight test runs with 100 iterations.
Figure 2 shows the average top set size |T | for each service, noise
level, and iteration. We use a logarithmic scale for the Y-axis, as the
top set size quickly decreases after a few iterations. For Apache and
nginx, the top set size quickly converges to about 3 to 4 candidates in
average for all noise levels. The same holds for OpenSSH, where the
top set size converges to about 2 to 3 candidates in average except
for noise level 50 where 100 iterations were not sufficient to identify
a small top set. The results show that the SEVered identification
mechanism is able to handle noisy environments by dynamically
increasing the number of iterations. Table 1 summarizes the number
of iterations and absolute time required for every service and noise
level until the top set converges to less than 5 candidates. Even in
the highest noise level, the top set converges in less than 23 seconds
and requires at most 22 iterations for the web servers.
To confirm that our noise model works as intended, we addition-
ally analyzed the results regarding the noise they contain. X-noise
is more critical than R-noise as it removes the target page from
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Table 1: Number of iterations and time required until top set
converges (|T | ≤ 5) for different noise levels.
Noise Level Apache Nginx OpenSSH
20 10 (7.4 s) 8 (5.56 s) 21 (38.85 s)
30 10 (7.5 s) 9 (6.62 s) 42 (85.47 s)
40 12 (9.7 s) 13 (13.2 s) 46 (111.09 s)
50 22 (23.0 s) 16 (17.84 s) >100 (>5 min)
Table 2: X-noise probability and average recording size for
different noise levels.
Noise Level Apache Nginx OpenSSH
20 35% (8,220) 34% (8,355) 63% (18,960)
30 49% (10,860) 51% (10,360) 78% (21,475)
40 60% (13,040) 62% (12,430) 85% (23,015)
50 74% (15,950) 69% (15,970) 90% (24,990)
the candidate list of the iteration for which it happens. Table 2
shows the probability that X-noise occurs in an iteration for all
noise levels. The table additionally shows the average size ofXi and
Ri recordings. The results show that our noise model introduces
significant X-noise in up to 90% of the Xi recordings and strongly
increases the size of recordings.
Summarizing, our identification mechanism’s design enables
quick resource identification and is robust against noise and thus
applicable in real-world scenarios. Note that the resource requests
can also be executed from several distributed clients to further hide
the attack. Among the candidate pages in the top set, we always
identified the last commonly accessed page to contain the target
resource for all services. This observation is comprehensible, as all
services must perform operations, such as opening a socket, before
transmitting the requested content. Together with our converged
top set, those observations allowed us in our test cases to always
correctly identify our target resource’s single page making the
attack very reliable to this point.
3.2 Data Extraction
With the knowledge about the location of the resource, we were
able to reliably extract the entire memory of the target VM on
our prototype implementation as described in Subsection 2.2. The
resource was always sticky (Subsection 2.4) over the whole process.
While preserving the VM’s stability at all times, the extraction of
its entire 2 GB also worked under the noise model introduced for
the identification phase. Table 3 summarizes the extraction speed
with different services for our single-page resource. With OpenSSH,
we experienced a higher response time reducing the extraction
speed for this case. A single-paged resource represents a worst-case
scenario, which can be significantly improved in practice when
identifying a larger resource. This requires fewer requests to the
target VM while receiving larger chunks of main memory.
Table 3: Extraction speed for different target services using
a one page-sized resource.
Apache Nginx OpenSSH
79.4 KB/sec 79.4 KB/sec 41.6 KB/sec
3.3 Discussion
Our evaluation shows that SEVered is feasible in practice and that it
can be used to extract the entire memory from a SEV-protected VM
within reasonable time. The results specifically show that critical
aspects, such as noise during the identification and the resource
stickiness are managed well by SEVered.
Nevertheless, there are multiple possibilities for future work to
further improve SEVered. For example, in various situations, a full
memory dump is not required. An attacker could consider only
extracting the private key of a web server. This key is likely to be
found among the pages accessed during a request, as it would have
to be accessed by the web server process in order to initiate an
encrypted connection. With this knowledge, an attacker could limit
the amount of pages possibly containing the TLS key to a fraction
of the VM’s memory, drastically reducing the extraction time. A
similar approach could be performed, for example, with password
hashes or disk encryption keys a service accesses in the course of a
request. An optimization to SEVered could be made by continuously
analyzing the received data during the extraction phase. As soon as
the targeted secret is found, the attacker could stop the extraction,
decreasing the duration of the attack, increasing its stealthiness.
4 COUNTERMEASURES
SEVered depends on both the possibility to track the VM’s accesses
to GPAs and the missing integrity protection. To prevent page faults
from leaking information, Shinde et al. [13] proposed a method
where processes create a deterministic sequence of page faults, in-
dependent from the input. However, this is not sufficient to hide the
VM’s accesses to the critical resource from the HV. The best a VM
can achieve is to generate additional page faults to complicate the
resource identification phase. Additionally, integrity protection can
hardly be achieved in software as the VM would require efficient
and reliable software mechanisms to protect itself from modifica-
tion of memory mappings and contents, e.g., by maintaining hashes
in a safe location. Both mechanisms seem hard to realize to reliably
protect an entire VM at all times, and would probably incur an in-
tolerable performance overhead. We thus consider software-based
countermeasures insufficient solutions against our attack. There-
fore, a modification of AMD SEV seems inevitable to fully prevent
SEVered. The best solution seems to be to provide a full-featured
integrity and freshness protection of guest-pages additional to the
encryption, as realized in Intel SGX. However, this likely comeswith
a high silicon cost to protect full VMs compared to SGX enclaves.
A low-cost efficient solution could be to securely combine the hash
of the page’s content with the guest-assigned GPA. This ensures
that pages can not easily be swapped by changing the GPA to HPA
mapping. Adding a nonce additionally ensures that an old page
for the GPA cannot be replayed into the guest by a malicious HV.
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Integration of such an approach into AMD SEV could effectively
prevent remapping.
Note that the not yet available extension SEV Encrypted State
(SEV-ES) does not protect against SEVered, since our attack does
not require access to any VM state encrypted by SEV-ES.
5 RELATEDWORK
While Payer [12] already pointed out the general problem of the
SEV approach when it was announced, to the best of our knowl-
edge, only one paper presenting an actual attack on SEV has been
published at the time of writing. Hetzelt and Buhren [9] changed
the program flow of an SSH service running in an SEV-encrypted
VM. Using page remapping, they were able to gain unauthorized
access to the service. This requires manual analysis of the SSH
service to recognize page access patterns for different data flows.
Our approach does neither require thorough analysis of a specific
target service, nor to alter the program flow within the target VM.
This eases the application of our method for different services and
sustains the target VM’s code integrity. Also, their method requires
data being located at certain offsets within a page reducing the
probability of a successful attack. In contrast, our results point out
the particularly high success probability of SEVered even in realis-
tic scenarios where the VM is under high load. Further, they also
require a victim logging into his user account in order to be able to
remap his session information to the attacker’s session who logs
in shortly after. In comparison, SEVered does not depend on any
interaction from a victim, as we can perform all requests necessary
for our attack ourselves remotely and at any time.
Buhren et al. [5] leveraged fault attacks on Secure Memory En-
cryption (SME) platforms, which SEV is built upon. They showed
that it is possible to extract the private RSA key of a GnuPG user
from encrypted memory. Their attacker model requires the attacker
to have control over a process running on the target system and
to have physical access to the system. They first used the process
on the target system to perform cache timing attacks in order to
identify relevant assets of a GnuPG process in memory. In the next
step, they made use of DMA to inject faults into those assets, which
caused GnuPG to create faulty signatures. They used these faulty
signatures to calculate parts of an RSA key offline. Their very spe-
cific concept solely applies to SME platforms, but not to VMs on
SEV environments and is difficult to execute on productive envi-
ronments. Our approach makes it possible to extract the whole
memory of a VM without physical access and without particular
knowledge or control over processes on the target VM.
Additionally, in contrast to our prototype, both [9] and [5] did not
realize the attack on real hardware, as only the AMD specifications
for SEV and SME were public. The results of our work strongly
indicate that [9] also works on real SEV platforms.
6 CONCLUSION
We presented the design and implementation of SEVered, an attack
that reliably extracts the full plaintext memory of VMs encrypted
with AMD SEV from a malicious HV. The only major requirement
for our method is the presence of a service in the VM, which pro-
vides a resource to the outside. Such services are usually easy to
find, since VMs are typically and widely used in server contexts
where they host web servers and other remotely accessible services.
We demonstrated the feasibility of our approach by realizing a pro-
totype on a recent AMD SEV-enabled platform. We evaluated the
prototype with different services, namely the Apache and nginx
web servers and an OpenSSH server. For every service, we con-
sidered various levels of concurrent accesses to evaluate SEVered
under different, realistic load conditions. In all cases, we were able
to efficiently identify the relevant resource of the target VM in
memory by analyzing the VM’s memory access patterns from the
HV. With the gained knowledge we were able to use the malicious
HV to remap the resource to other memory pages and to iteratively
request all the VM’s memory in reasonable time. As SEVered is in-
dependent of the specific service, our method can easily be adapted
to a variety of different attack scenarios in practice. SEVered demon-
strates that a malicious HV still remains able to extract sensitive
data from its SEV-enabled guest VMs.
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